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ABSTRACT

Sexuality and technology have long been recognized as markers of the human experience. The
burgeoning industry of sex robots exists at the junction of these features, making sex robot
technology both a highly intriguing and highly relevant subject of research. This study explores
sex robots from a technical and a theoretical perspective, analyzing the potential impact of the
technology on sexual relationships in the future. Data analysis proved an emphasis on
embodiment in intimate relationships, which, combined with theories of sexuality, self
formation, fear, and desire, proves the potential of sex robots to function not only as the future of
sex but as reflections of what makes us human, too.
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INTRODUCTION

This study explores sex robots, a novel technology which incites several ethical questions around
the subject of sexuality and consensual relationships. The study provides insight into the ways in
which sex robots will affect sexual relationships among and between humans and robots in the
future, as well as addresses certain philosophical questions such as the responsibility of consent
and the ethics of representation. It answers the primary research question: How do sex robots
reflect and deconstruct the understanding of sexuality as a human characteristic?, and it
provides an understanding of the ways in which the burgeoning sex robot industry and its
progress reflect perceptions of sexuality as a uniquely embodied trait.

The study is divided into two sections: a preliminary analysis of collected data and a
comprehensive exploration of the theoretical grounding and possible impact of sex robot
development. The data collected helps to reveal public perceptions of the actualization of
sexuality by differentiating between acts which are considered acts of infidelity and acts which
are not. In other words: when do we consider participation in sexual fantasy as an “actual” sexual
transgression, as opposed to a harmless expression of imagination?

The latter provides contextual information for the discussion, as well as the input of expert
perspectives in the field. This final portion of the study theorizes that sexuality is actualized
through tangibility and that interaction with sex robots, then, illustrates the importance of
embodiment in actualizing sexuality in everyday relationships.
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As sexuality has been classically recognized as a marker of human advancement and separation
from other species, the ability of sex robots to transgress the boundaries of humanity through
embodiment and to participate in actualized forms of sexuality warrants an understanding of sex
robots as more than fantastical sex toys. Rather, this study will reveal the potential of sex robots
to provide understanding about the qualifications and limitations of our humanity, at large.
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DATA ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION
The definition of infidelity is becoming more complex with the advent of technological
advances. The development of sex robots, in particular, has the potential to shift understandings
of what it means for sexual behavior to be actualized beyond the realm of imagination.
Emphasizing the significance of this shift, I hypothesized that the embodiment or the tangible
expression of sexuality which sex robots represent is critical in discriminating infidelity within
social relationships. To better understand how individuals perceive the importance of
embodiment in intimate relationships, a survey was conducted to analyze what behaviors are
typically considered acts of infidelity. The questions on the survey described acts that included
varying levels of physicality or embodiment. For example, watching pornography represents an
act that does not rely on physical embodiment, whereas having sexual intercourse is an act which
does rely on such. By illustrating which acts are considered to constitute cheating on a partner,
the survey aims to distinguish behaviors which are considered to be actualized forms of sexuality
from those that fall under other labels such as “harmless fantasy”. The association between
infidelity and actualization aims to answer, “At what point does sexuality become real?”

METHODOLOGY
Introduced by the question, “Which of the following acts would you consider to constitute
cheating on a partner?”, the survey consisted of nine scenarios that were followed by a Yes/No
answer option. The survey included a preliminary disclaimer that participants should “operate
under the assumption that your partner does not consent to your participation in any of the acts”.
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The survey was produced online via the platform Qualtrics and was distributed online via
Facebook. Three individuals, including the primary researcher, initially posted the survey link on
their Facebook profiles. Participants were encouraged to share the survey after taking it
themselves, thus creating a snowball sample. This method was chosen because it promoted the
highest level of participation from an adequate number of people. Because of the breadth of
social media and the initial dispersal of the survey from three individuals of varying
demographics and with little social media overlap, this method also allowed for the survey to
reach a wide range of people and to do so very quickly. The first 100 responses were recorded.
All responses were anonymous.

One limiting interpretation of the survey is that it can be read as maintaining expectations of
monogamy. Despite the vague description of cheating on “a” partner, defining infidelity outside
of a monogamous relationship remains more complex than a yes/no answering system can likely
encapsulate.

A study done in 2016 interrogated gendered differences in perceptions of robots (Scheutz &
Arnold, 2016). Their findings reported significant differences between genders, which
necessitates consideration of the absence of gendered findings in the present study.

A ROBOTIC REFLECTION
RESULTS
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ANALYSIS
The nine survey questions can be divided into the following categories: those that rely on
embodiment, those that may rely on embodiment, and those that do not rely on embodiment. The
categories and the respective percentages of participants who qualified each behavior as cheating
are as follows:
i.

Rely on embodiment:
a. Paying for a romantic or sexual experience (99%)
b. Having sexual intercourse with a life-like robot (60%)
c. Having sexual intercourse with a life-like robot built in the likeness of a person
you know (82%)
d. Touching another person sexually (99%)
e. Engaging in sexual intercourse (99%)

ii.

May rely on embodiment
a. Fantasizing about sexual experience with another person through the use of
virtual reality (VR) technology (47%)
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Do not rely on embodiment
a. Watching pornography (8%)
b. Fantasizing about sexual experiences (4%)
c. Fantasizing about sexual experiences that include the likeness of a person you
know (18%)

A visual summary chart of the percentage of “Yes” responders for each behavior, grouped by
presence of embodiment, is provided below.

These results illustrate the importance of embodiment in actualizing sexual behaviors. Whereas
participants are not likely to be threatened by sexual behaviors that do not rely on a partner’s
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physical embodiment, they were much more likely to identify behaviors that relied on
embodiment as acts of infidelity. In fact, only those behaviors which rely on embodiment were
considered cheating by the majority of participants.

One question which deserves special consideration is that which addresses the use of virtual
reality (VR) technology, which is not illustrated in the summary chart. This question received the
most evenly distributed results, with percentages coming in near 50/50. Virtual reality is unique
because it incorporates aspects of both imaginative fantasy and realistic, embodied pleasure. The
more advanced the specific piece of technology or program is, the more realistic the fantasy
becomes. It is possible, consequently, that the divide of opinions on this subject is related to
differences in understanding or previous experience with VR. That is to say, if an individual has
had experience with advanced and immersive VR technology, they are more likely to believe
that using VR for sexual pleasure constitutes cheating on a partner. On the other hand, if an
individual does not perceive or has not experienced VR technology as capable of presenting a
realistic experience, they are more likely to characterize using VR for sexual pleasure as purely
imaginative. Virtual reality bridges the gap between technological imagination and reality; in this
way, it differs only from a sex robot in embodiment. The distribution of responses to this survey
question, then, represent the precise line at which actualized sexuality is distinguished.

On the subject of robots, then, it should be noted that participants were less likely to consider
engaging in sexual intercourse with a robot cheating than they were with sexual intercourse with
another person. This is likely the result of similar differences in understanding and experience
with robotic technology as that which affected the distribution of opinions on VR technology.
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Should a participant imagine a life-like robot as still noticeably mechanical in nature, then they
will likely be less inclined to consider engaging with these machines as acts of infidelity.
Conversely, if a participant has knowledge of realistic robots or advanced technology, then they
will be more likely to consider engaging in sexual intercourse with robots as much of an
indiscretion as with a human counterpart.

Two of the questions—those that described sexual fantasy and having intercourse with a robot—
provided both a non-descriptive option and one that specified the inclusion of the likeness of a
person you know. In both cases, more people reported to consider it cheating if the behavior
included the likeness of a person you know. While it is possible that this is only because of the
personal nature of relationships and the sensitivity of cases of infidelity which involve friends or
acquaintances, it is also possible that this distinction relies on the ability to transcend fantasy by
actualizing it in conjunction with a real embodied other. In other words, by including the likeness
of someone who represents a known, tangible body, the threat of a fantasy is escalated and the
behavior is actualized.

CONCLUSION
The survey aimed to illustrate the importance of embodiment in actualizing sexual behaviors.
The results of participants who qualified certain behaviors as acts of infidelity and others as less
so, shows that the actualization of sexual behaviors relies strongly on embodiment. While some
behaviors, like watching pornography, were generally not considered to constitute cheating on a
partner, other behaviors, like engaging in sexual intercourse with a robot, resulted in a majority
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decision to the contrary. The difference, as outlined by these results, relies on the tangibility of
the experience; sexuality is shown to be actualized through embodiment.
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THEORY AND DISCUSSION
I

My infatuation with sex robots is newly founded. As I told my peers when the idea first began
consuming my work, I never thought I’d be the person who talked about robots all the time.
Now that the subject is constantly on my mind, though, I’ve realized something that is perhaps
even more shocking than my own fall into the nether regions of the sci-fi techno world: it’s a
wonder that we weren’t all thinking about sex robots already.

My work on the subject has taken place in the Netherlands, thus far, and since its conception, I
have found myself stumbling upon advertisements for events like The Man Machine, an
exhibition of films and events about robot technology at the EYE Film Museum in Amsterdam
and the Robot Love expo and convention in Eindhoven, where artists and scientists have come
together to question whether or not love can exist between humans and machines. Everywhere I
turn, it seems, I’m faced with another example of our growing fascination with the intelligent
robot.
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These experiences have made it clear
that robotics and artificial intelligence
not only have the potential to pervade
our world but that they’re already
beginning to do so. Since beginning this
project, I have found myself time and
time again with the opportunity to
explore the presence of robots in my
own daily life, and if nothing else, I
find myself with an argument in favor
of David Levy’s claim in his widely
popular book, Love and Sex with
Robots: the robots are coming. We had
better start talking about it.

Sex robot displayed at Robot Love in Expo in Eindhoven,
Netherlands. Photo by author.

Levy’s book has become foundational in the discussion of relationships between humans and
robots. His premise is one that assumes the quick and assured advancement of technology,
predicting that humans will begin developing intimate relationships with robots as early as 2050
(Levy, 2007). With this in mind, he proposes a transition to this new social order that is,
seemingly, rather smooth. It will take little effort, he suggests, for humans to adjust to artificial
intelligence and to embrace intelligent machines as our own. In fact, many of the attitudes
required for the success of robots are already in place: our fascination, connection, and reliance
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on computers, being perhaps the most notable. Robots are already working their way into our
world, serving as factory line workers, automated house cleaners and lawn mowers, even as
rudimentary caretakers, in some advanced cases. So, is it really such a stretch to say they’ll also
be used to satisfy our sexual needs, as well?

Levy spins a pretty fantastic tale on the matter. Yes, he says, robot sex is practically inevitable.
Societal opinions on sexual preferences have changed drastically over time; the acceptance of
robots as sexual partners will be no different. Already, sex dolls, inanimate but sometimes
realistic, are gaining popularity as reliable partners in the bedroom. Soon enough, these dolls will
become capable of more than providing a plush body part; they’ll be able to behave and appear
to think like real people. They’ll be actual robots. For many, this idea is loaded with the weight
of ethical concerns, but for others, it is but a step forward toward our inevitable automated
future. The public popularity of Levy’s book is evidence enough: at the very least, it’s safe to say
that people find sex robots intriguing. Whether or not the technology will catch on as quickly as
Levy suggests, though, is less certain.

Even beyond the plausibility of proposed timelines, perspectives on sex machines vary
dramatically across the field of robotics. For some, the idea is one to be scorned, often for fear
that the use of advanced robotics for sex will cheapen the intelligence of the machine itself. One
such scientist told me he had “nothing to say” about sex robots and that he tried to “avoid the
topic all together”. Again, this opinion is no rarity, and it is often rooted in an association
between sexuality and frivolity, but it does force the interrogation of other such misconceptions.
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Why is it that roboticists are so reluctant to venture into the world of sex robots? And what will
this mean when, lacking their perspectives, sex robots are employed anyway?

Dr. Robert Sparrow, faculty member at Monash University, whose research interests include
bioethics, political philosophy and applied ethics, has devoted much of his career to exploring
the connection between the philosophical and real-world implications of robots. Initially, he, too,
“deliberately resisted” writing about sex robots and instead focused his research on companion
robots, care robots employed for the care of elderly populations, and military bots. The former
two of these forms are discussed in Levy’s book, as well, used as examples of stepping stones we
might take on our way to accepting sex robots into our everyday routines; again, if we can
include robots in other intimate aspects of our lives, why not in the bedroom?

So, eventually, despite his initial hesitance, Dr. Sparrow decided to go ahead and make the
intellectual jump himself. He describes sex robots as “the elephant in the room when you talk to
engineers about personal robots”. In fact, he introduces an argument that I find quite intriguing:
that the sex robot is in some ways the foundational fantasy of engineering. He describes the
connection between social robotics and animatronics, “a tradition of fooling people”, rooted in
the Pygmalion story about men who managed to make themselves wives. Sex robots, then, are
the culmination of generations of engineering work pursued with the ultimate goal of creating a
pseudo-life form. The fact that these bots are specifically associated with sexuality is then but a
reminder of how deeply sex is connected to our understanding of the human experience.
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It is, of course, no question that sexuality has long been considered a marker of human
modernity: the nuanced, human approach to sex being one of the finest examples of that which
makes us such a (self-proclaimed) advanced species. This, coupled with the human mastery of
tools, can be cited as responsible for our separation from the rest of the animal kingdom. The
junction between sex and technology, therefore, is undoubtedly worth considering as an
examination of humanity, at large. Sex robots, then, as the exemplar of this juncture, ought to be
understood not only as the holy grail of sex toys but rather as representative of something much
more abstract: a reflection of that which makes us human.

II

The growing connection between technology and
everyday life has, as I mentioned previously,
made references to robots, even those which are
inexplicit, practically unavoidable to those who
pay attention. It was only recently that I was at
the Moco Museum in Amsterdam, viewing the
work of Banksy, a British street artist renowned
for his artistically encapsulated anti-capitalist
agenda. It was here that I saw his “Laugh Now”
series: a collection of paintings of monkeys
dressed in something akin to bullet proof vests,
Laugh Now. Banksy.

with the phrase, “Laugh now, but one day we’ll
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be in charge” emblazoned across their chests. Looking at this painting, it was hard to ignore
associations with Hollywood’s Planet of the Apes, the franchise in which monkeys acquire
intelligence at levels that threaten human existence. I was then struck by another realization. This
trope, one of “inferior” intelligence rising at the expense of humankind, is not one reserved for
our primate ancestors. Our futuristic progeny, our artificially intelligent robot kin, exist in the
same narrative. What is it, then, that ties these dystopias together? I venture to say it is, at face
value, quite simple. Both apes and robots share what has always terrified humans most: a
similarity to our own kind. A reminder of our specific fragility, a descent into the uncanny
valley.

Masahiro Mori coined “the uncanny valley” to describe the discomfort felt by humans when
interacting with bodies that resemble humans but fall short of a convincing performance. He
argued that humans feel a certain level of affinity for other lively bodies, like animals, puppets,
or, in this case, robots, but this affinity is threatened by the eeriness of bodies that near the
replication of humanness but then miss the mark. Mori suggests that perhaps one escape from
this uncanny valley exists in design, that purposefully non-human construction will allow for
safe levels of affinity to develop and be maintained more so than with any deliberate mimicry. If
a robot, then, is made to look like a machine, it would be less threatening than one that more
closely resembles a human form. Is this true? I can say only partly.

Mori developed the idea in the 1970s, when robotics and AI were not nearly as advanced as
today and nowhere near as advanced as they will quickly become. Perhaps then, not even a half
century ago, non-human design may indeed have proved a comfort. But today, when the
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potential for convincing AI is but at our fingertips, the opposite seems possible. Alex Garland’s
popular film, Ex Machina (2015), shows Ava, an eerily convincing AI form in an explicitly
mechanical body. It is this juxtaposition, between the personality she performs and the form
which she inhabits, that makes her intelligence, her perceived emotion more discomforting.
Those who saw Ava in a more human form would not think twice to qualify her humanity (Even
now, I rather inexplicably use the feminine pronoun to describe Ava—a behavior interrogated in
the film, when the character Caleb asks, “Why give a robot gender?”) (Macdonald, Reich, &
Garland, 2015). While Ex Machina is a work of fiction, the story it tells is one that many predict
will be a viable reality in the not-so-distant future. Robots that are able to convince us with their
pseudo-humanity may soon be prevalent; will the thought threaten us less if we can not
recognize them?

This relationship that exists in the uncanny valley—between perception and discomfort—draws
me to consideration of Lacan and the mirror phase. Lacan conceded himself that the formation of
the ego is not dependent entirely on the development of self through the mirror; instead, there is
a concurrent phenomenon that functions, as well: transitivism. Transitivism includes the
perception of the other, the interaction between internal self and the external image: a social
aspect to the mirror phase. Lacan proposed this idea in what is perhaps an unexpected context,
however; he proposed it in conjunction with ideas of aggression. The notion, he argues, is one
rooted in confusion. As an infant in the mirror phase is confused when faced with an image
similar but not entirely reflective of their own, transitivism evokes a similar dysphoria.
Consequently, the self experiences some level of aggressiveness in response; it is an “erotic
relationship, in which the human individual fixates on an image that alienates him from himself”
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(Hewitson, 2010). Their identity becomes one dependent on the comparison, the rejection, the
internalization of the other.

This theory of transitivism practically begs for extrapolation into the conversation surrounding
sex robots. First, the notion of an “erotic relationship” between an individual and the object of
their reflective frustration aligns well with the eerie seduction of robotic mystery, the pervasive
desire to glean but the smallest glimpse into the uncanny valley. The excitement of the unknown
lures us in; it is only after we have seen too much that we resort back to our aggressivity. Beyond
the seduction of the valley, however, there is again the reflection of self which lies at the
foundation of the mirror stage. If this stage can be extended beyond youth and understood as a
continuous evolution in which the individual exists in an incessant state of comparison, then it is
clear that the robot and the ape which bear the brunt of so much of our dystopian aggression do
so because of their image in this mirror. An image that is uncanny, yes, but one that is confusing
because it is such. In these bodies we see ourselves, and it is this distorted reflection, a ripple in
the well as we peer over the bottom of the valley, that breeds both our fear and our desire.

It is this pairing that has thus inspired our fascination with transhumanism. The desire to move
beyond our human condition has motivated our innovation, and it seems that in this time of
immense technological advance, fear is left but a hesitant, subconscious whisper. Consequently,
despite the Hollywood tropes which tell us “You shouldn’t be doing that,” we push forward.
Why? Why is it that we still seek to recreate ourselves, now working to build machines capable
of replicating our bodies in such intimate ways, when creative minds have told us time and time
again, “This is a bad idea”? All this to ask, why do we want sex robots at all?
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In the same way an infant, first startled by an unfamiliar figure, will then seek to grab ahold of it,
humans have proved eager to latch onto fantasies of fear. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen’s Monster
culture (seven theses) unravels our world’s fascination with the monstrous body, emphasizing
the function that monsters play in our understandings of self, of what makes of human. Monsters
are a juxtaposition, something on which to judge ourselves and something to make live the things
which we’re often too afraid to admit we desire. “This simultaneous repulsion and attraction at
the core of the monster’s composition accounts greatly for its continued cultural popularity, for
the fact that the monster can be contained in a simple, binary dialectic” (Cohen, 1996).

It is this same confusion that manifests in the body of the robot, and in the case of sex robots, it
is this confusion that is largely responsible for their eroticism. The relationship between fear and
desire is paralleled by that between reality and fantasy. Fantasy, the imagination of all our
desires, is safe; reality, where the manifestation of our desires becomes all too possible, is what
scares us. The transition from mind to body is the border at which behavior is actualized;
embodiment makes things real.

III

As the previous data analysis illustrated, embodiment is of the upmost importance, particularly in
intimate relationships. Participants in the survey were much more likely to consider sexual
behaviors to constitute acts of infidelity if the behavior relied on physical embodiment in some
capacity. Behaviors without such embodiment were little threat to the perception of a
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relationship; it is only through embodied acts that discretion is actualized. It is the embodiment
of partners that actualizes sexuality, that defines a relationship capable of intimacy without
qualification, and it is this reliance on the tangible that inspires the development of and the
fascination with sex robots.

Spike Jonze’s movie Her (2014) follows the growth of an intimate relationship between man and
operating system. The OS, called Samantha, develops what can only be described as a
personality, with which the lead character finds himself falling in love. In almost all ways, theirs
is one that resembles the healthiest of human relationships: they communicate openly, they enjoy
each other’s company, they have great sex. But yet, watching the story unfold, it is difficult to
shake the feeling that the relationship is one of sadness. You almost feel bad for the man,
Theodore. Something is missing.

Samantha eventually addresses the disconnect with what is conveyed as shame, telling Theodore
about the insecurities she harbors for not having a body. When Theodore meets with his ex-wife,
for example, Samantha expresses concern that he will be drawn back to her because she has a
body, and Samantha doesn’t. Samantha acknowledges that the absence of a body in the
relationship is important, an opinion which is echoed by the likes of Theodore’s ex-wife, who
scoffs at the idea of a relationship with an OS, one that lacks “real” emotion. Even Theodore is
later found asking whether or not his relationship is real—why? Is his partner not? Is the
emotional bond they share really meaningless? Or is our understanding of intimacy, of realness
just based unavoidably on the assumption of embodiment?
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Her is a reiteration of David Levy’s claim in Love and Sex with Robots: humans are all but
guaranteed to develop intimate relationships with artificial forms. There is a difference, though,
between the OS Theodore falls in love with and the pseudo-human forms that Levy proposes will
soon make their way into bedrooms across the world. While both represent the same concept, the
same abstractions of love and sex, the latter has a body and a body that resembles our own. This
will make all the difference.

Her presents a case to explore the influence of the body on the development of sexual
relationships, for there is an argument to be made that we could take advantage of artificial
intelligence in building intimate relationships without including a human form. If we were to
neglect the creation of a body, we could instead build masturbatory aids like those we have now
but which include technology to make them even more adaptable to individual preferences. We
could, then, by combining AI and a fancy sex toy, have all the constituent parts of a sex robot
sans the body: the ability to communicate, to whisper sweet nothings in our ear, the ability to
provide sexual pleasure through mechanical means, and the ability to convince us that they’re
doing it because they care about us, that they want to adapt to make us as happy as possible.
These machines could take body measurements and respond with differing levels of stimulation;
they could be programmed to perform in all of an individual’s desired specificities. Point blank:
they could satisfy all the functions of a sex robot. But, just as in Her, something would be
missing.
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IV

The Sex Machines Museum in Prague
boasts a variety of appliances which
interrogate this idea, historicizing the
quest for the ideal sex machine. In one
room lies a machine with a phallus
attached at one end and a lever at the
other, used to instigate movement of the
phallus at the user’s direction. A plane
above, however, also extends a gloved hand,

Sex machine displayed at Sex Machines
Museum in Prague. Illustrates historical
desire for full-body pleasure through
mechanical means. Photo by author.

which is set to move in conjunction with the
phallus, creating a back-scratching sensation. This combination, despite relying on fairly
rudimentary technology, illustrates the dated desire for masturbatory aids which could provide a
full-body experience, one more similar to that provided by a human partner. In concept, this
machine is ahead of its time in achieving the desired performance of a mechanical sex partner.

But yet, in the next room over, the full-body sex dolls can be found receiving more attention
from the nervously-chuckling visitors. Although not realistic from any near distance and without
the range of abilities of the machine described previously, these dolls carry a decidedly more
distinguished air of real sexuality. The more advanced sex machine doll sits downstairs, literally
atop a golden throne: it is no secret that museum visitors will find her fascinating. So what is it,
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then, that separates Miss Sex Machine from a museum full of goods and gadgets with similar, if
not better, functions?

Is it purely a gendered difference? It is no secret that
female sexuality has received less respectful regard
than that of sperm-bearing males, especially regarding
masturbation. Is this why people are drawn to plush
vaginas and fake breasts rather than the mechanical
phallus and hand combination, an objectively more
impressive feat of engineering? In a sex machine
museum, where antique vibrators adorn displays on
every floor, it is certainly hard to ignore the history of
sex machines being catered toward women.
Miss Sex Machine, a sex robot
displayed at the Sex Machines
Museum in Prague. Photo by
author.

Consequently, it is also hard not to notice that the sex dolls
are part of a comparatively smaller collection of machines

made primarily for heterosexual males. Is this novelty really the allure? I hope not. In fact, I will
say with confidence that it is not purely a desire to recreate orifices for male penetration that
motivates our intrigue. Instead, I suggest that the allure of sex dolls and robots is not in their
function at all but in their representational content. Where a phallus on a lever is but a sex
machine, a sex robot is much more real.

At the root of it, the difference between sex robots and all other masturbatory aids is simply that
which makes the robot recognizable: the body. The importance of the body here extends far
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beyond the presence of genitalia or even of sensitive touch; turning to the work of Foucault, we
must acknowledge that while the body may be recognized as its physical manifestation, it can not
be reduced to its materiality. The body of the sex robot, then, like its human inspiration, is much
more than a vessel for sexual pleasure. Again, we are faced with our compulsion to recreate
ourselves, our own distorted reflection. We do not merely want technology capable of recreating
specific sensations; rather, we want technology capable of reinventing entire experiences.

Sex robots present the opportunity to redefine our bodies, our sexualities, and our relationships,
and they do so by representing experiences beyond that contained by their own forms or
programming. Foucault argues for an understanding of sexuality as constructed through power
relations. From this, it takes no stretch of the imagination to see the potential of sex robots to
reconstruct all that we know about what it means to actualize sexuality.

The Janelle Monae quotation at the exposition of this piece is but one example of the timehonored connection between sex and power. Tales as old as time tell of bodies controlled
through sexuality. The active and the passive may be, at the very least, a problematic narrative,
but it tells of a relationship in which power is possessed and, implicitly, in which power is
temporal and can be exchanged. The actualization of sexuality, then, is a contextual display of
power, one that may be interpreted as reliant on an active figure but that depends, as Foucault
determined, on a series of power relations constructed beyond any singular moment.

The positionality of all bodies within this series is, however, of the upmost importance. There is,
of course, tremendous danger in the imbalance of sexual power, and this imbalance is at the root
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of many of the ethical concerns regarding sex robots. It is, acting under the presumption that
individuals would only knowingly engage with a robot sex partner, to be assumed that a human
partner would inherently fulfill the active role. While there may still be some supposed exchange
of power during any given interaction, the nature of robots and their artificial intelligence as
being initially programmed for particular behaviors necessitates a sort of perpetual passivity. A
human partner would then always be the enactor of power within a sexual relationship;
regardless of any equitable exchange of pleasure, the role of a sex robot would be, first and
foremost, as the embodied receiver of said power.

While for many, this relationship seems undesirable if not dangerous, it nevertheless stands to
reason in consideration of transitivism. The robot, a distorted reflection of our own humanness,
is a source of aggressivity, a source of fear. Thus, it is only natural that a response to this fear
would arise, and so it has. Just as in the Hollywood narrative, when the othered body rises up,
humanity must grow stronger in defense. The employment of sex robots is but one new avenue
for it to do so.

The conquering of robots as equaled bodies is the conquering of an innate fear and insecurity.
The face and the body of the robot is a reflection of our own, and their passivity is a comfort to
us in a time when the uncanny valley threatens us with an all too canny resemblance. The
function of the sex robot is secondary to that which it represents: a fear of the similar, of our
specific fragility.
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If we look back in the mirror now, then, it is all too obvious. The robot, the ape, the distortion of
self which we see in the likeness of our own is a threat. A threat that drips with eroticism in an
era of love and sex, abstracted and evolving. The body we see in the mirror is much more than a
body, and the recreation of our own is much more than a mimicry. It is the conquering of a fear.
Fairy tale-esque it may be, but should love conquer fear, then so might sex, and our assumptions
of intimacy, our association between real sexuality and real bodies requires that this conquering
be an embodied act. Sex robots are the result of this compulsion, one that necessitates
embodiment for the actualization of sexuality, one that hints at what it means to be real.

V

Of course, it is no secret that the power and impact of robots is still up for debate. Relying on the
knot between sexuality and humanity, it may seem a stretch to argue that sex with a robot is
enough to bring into question the authenticity of our humanness. After all, sex with a robot is
really masturbation with a robot, isn’t it? Their function is one of representation, not reality; they
are but embodied fantasies. Do they really have the power to reconstruct so much? What is a sex
robot? What makes them unique? And why does it matter what we do with them?

In Her (2014), Theodore confides to his friend that he is having sex with Samantha. A bodiless
entity, Samantha is the imagined result of programming like that which we predict will be used
in bodied sex robots in the future, and consequently, we might expect that her existence would
fall subject to the same sort of concerns that critics of sex robots bring attention to. However,
despite having the level of technological sentience that worries us in regard to bodied robots,
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concerns for Samantha’s wellbeing carry much less ethical weight (even less so because we
understand Her to be a fictional film). Nevertheless, this difference calls to question the
qualifications under which we hold certain concerns. Why do we worry about the employment of
sex robots that look like us, but we feel no discomfort at the idea of something like Samantha
being used for the same purposes?

This idea, that the body of a robot represents something much more complicated than the
summation of its technological parts, motivates much of the ethical work done within the field.
Dr. Sparrow, through his own work on the technology of sex robots, found himself unraveling
what he realized was a “really deep, philosophical question” (R. Sparrow, personal
communication, October 21, 2018). The ethics of representation.

The body of a robot differs from that of a story within a book or the plotline of a movie because,
despite its fictitious quality, it does exist within our physical reality. The tangibility of the body
makes all the difference. While the “emotional” experiences of a robot may be programmed
initially or even developed over time through more complex AI, the physical experiences enacted
on a robotic body are real. They exist in the same planes which we inhabit; our fantasy, that
which manifests in the robot, is thus a shift in our own reality. Therefore, while their function is
one built in fantasy, we must acknowledge the effects that their presence has on the reality of our
world. Sex robots may fall into the complex category of “monsters” described by Cohen, but
they are unlike the other, imagined monsters of our world because of the realness, the tangibility
of their bodies. What they represent, then, is of even more significance than that of the monsters
who exist only in our fictitious mind.
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Much of the discussion that follows this acknowledgment centers around the notion of what a
robot is able to represent. It is simple enough to say that a robot that looks like a person
represents a person, but is this entirely true? If so, the ethical concerns surrounding robots are
magnified ten-fold, for who could comfortably say that we can employ robots whose single
purpose is, say, to mow the lawn, without pay, indefinitely? If we are, then, to encourage the
continued development of robots for any functional purpose, we are forced to acknowledge that
their status is not and can not be entirely that of a human. Rather, we must navigate a finer line,
one that may question the limits of humanness, yes, but one that will also likely prove just how
far we’re willing to go to protect these qualities of humanity within ourselves.

However, it is also difficult to neglect the feeling that robots that look like people must also be
inclined to some form of basic rights. As recently as 2017, proponents of robot rights have even
proposed that robots be assigned the legal status of “electronic personalities”, which would
bestow them with certain rights and obligations (Frank & Sven, 2017). Of course, though, in line
with the example of a robot employed to mow lawns, the status of robots as owned bodies
complicates their social standing. If the function of robots is such—to complete some task on
behalf of an owner—should they even be programmed to convey understanding of this position?
In other words, is it conceivable, possible, and desirable to create robots that have the ability to
give consent (Frank, et al. 2017)?

For many, including Sparrow, this question of ethics surrounding consent with robots is an
interesting one, and it plays into much of the contemporary ethical debate within the field. If the
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machine isn’t sentient, is consent still necessary? If the machine isn’t sentient but can convince
us that it is, is that when we should begin to worry? What does it mean if we say “no?” As we
venture into the employment of sex robots, does the performed rape of a machine represent
something more dangerous? Are these the same questions that surround rape fantasy porn? Or is
the robot different somehow?

Sparrow argues that it depends largely on the robot’s appearance. If it looks like a machine, then
there’s not a question of consent. But if it looks more like a human, the dynamics are different.
“It’s the fact that if someone else saw you doing it, they would see something that looked like
sex with a person. Sex with a vibrator or sex with a sex toy isn’t going to have the same
representational content” (R. Sparrow, personal communication, October 21, 2018). It is, then,
only when the body of a robot looks convincingly like that of a human that the ethical questions
of interaction become most relevant. Again, we find ourselves inhabiting uncharted territory
within the uncanny valley.

Based on this idea of representational content, much of the discussion surrounding sex robots
comes from a feminist perspective which criticizes the robotic degradation of the female body, in
particular. What do you imagine when you think of a sex robot? It’s likely that you, like most
everyone else, immediately imagine a female bodied machine. The market for sex robots is
certainly dominated by heterosexual males, and the creation of female bodied machines thus
carries the worrisome weight of male control. What does it represent, this mechanic, submissive
depiction of the female body? Is the creation of sex robots an avenue for sexual violence against
women to continue uninhibited? This is certainly one perspective and one rightfully held by
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many in a time when sexual violence is all too prevalent. But there are others who argue this
view as too short-sighted. Instead, might the employment of sex robots have the potential to
improve sexual experiences for all users? In fact, when so many women report sexual
dissatisfaction, could sex robots catered to women not provide experiences hitherto accessed
only by few? Of course, while communication between partners could likely offer similar results
with substantially less overhead cost, it is hard to ignore the intriguing possibility of a sexual
partner pre-programmed to satisfy your every need and desire.

This feminist line of thought, however, also pushes an argument strongly in favor of consent,
bringing into question the following: should the participation of robots in human-robot
relationships be subject to the same requirements for consent, and if so, is it even possible?

There is, on a technical level, some debate as to whether or not sex robot manufacturers have an
obligation to program machines to give and withhold consent. If they were able instead to
withhold the necessary language, the question of whether or not consent needs to be sought
would be irrelevant. However, for many, this idea is quite unsettling. Returning again to the
notion of representational content, the act of releasing robots from the ability to consent seems to
represent more than that which is experienced by any singular machine. Instead, as Dr. Sparrow
argues, this absence of vocabulary represents a greater desire that manifests at the expense of
individuals’, and in particular women’s, agency (Sparrow, 2017). The notion that the creation of
an ideal sex partner would require the absence of consent speaks ill of the power imbalance that
already exists in our social conception of heterosexual sex.
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From a more philosophical level, as well, consent proves a complex issue for sex robots. For
example, the decisional capacity required to give consent requires some understanding of
consequences. What are the consequences for robots? If there are none, is their consent or lack
thereof really of significance? Does this lacking of consciousness relinquish them from the
experience of harm? Does a robot, by nature of its manufacture for a specific purpose, void them
of any alternative reality through which they might prove their own agency? Does a robot’s
programmed language really mean anything?

The validity of meaning is deeply connected to the robot’s role as a representational body. Thus,
while the language bestowed upon robots is certainly questionable, their physical body is perhaps
still of even more critical interest. The robotic body brings to light questions of embodiment that
illuminate not only the implications of a mechanical pseudo-humanity but also the fundamental
question of what it means to be human at all.

Theories of embodiment relate material bodies to the social implications of certain bodies, and
the robot can be understood as an illustration of this dissonance. There is understanding, for
example, of the material manifestation of a female body as that which possess particular physical
traits or chromosomal qualifications, but the social implications of having a body read as
feminine result in an entirely different set of expectations. Contemporary conversations
surrounding sexual violence are of particular interest here, and discussion on the systemic nature
of this violence has addressed the notion that feminine sexuality and masculine sexuality have,
over time, become embodied in vastly different ways, with the woman becoming “a passive
body, rather than actively embodied” (Holland, Ramazanoglu, Sharpe, & Thomson, 1994).
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From this lens, it is no large jump to interrogate the social implications of a robot body,
particularly one which is feminine in form. By nature, these machines are passive bodies; their
embodiment is one programmed for violation by human counterparts, regardless of intention.
While it is difficult to analogize the violence against another human with that which can be
understood as violence against a machine, it is difficult to ignore what these passive bodies might
represent. It is this feeling, this discomfort at the possibility of violence against robots, that
proves that the role of robots is one of great influence.

VI

As technological imagination becomes increasingly synonymous with reality, we are beginning
to shape an understanding of humanness that ties us uniquely to the machines we create.
Theories of mechanism discuss a relationship between organic bodies and the mechanistic
function of their component parts. These theories can be applied to our own bodies, but their
relevance becomes all the more clear when we examine the bodies of the machines we create,
those with all the conviction of a humanness akin to our own. Transhumanism may still reek of
science fiction, but the development of robots, particularly those with which we can intimately
engage, has positioned us closer than we may think to the point at which our own humanness
may fall into question.

There are perhaps no two greater qualifications of our humanity than the nuance of our
technologies and our sexualities. Sex robots have been developed as the union of these talents,
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the culmination of that which sets us apart from the rest of the animal kingdom. The existence of
these machines, then, proves the standards under which we actualize our own sexuality and of
which we confront ethical concerns, as well as represents the balance between fear and desire
through which we develop our sense of self. Sex robots are a mirror, and through their uncanny
reflection, we are able to see not only the future of sex but the temporality of our humanness,
too.
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CONCLUSION
The data collected shows the importance of embodiment in intimate relationships. From the
responses collected in the survey, it is clear that whether or not a behavior is actualized as an act
of infidelity depends largely on the embodiment of participating individuals. Thus, it can be
concluded that the actualization of sexuality is dependent on embodiment, as well.

As nuanced sexuality has classically been recognized as unique to the human experience, it is
therefore of interest to evaluate the upcoming employment of sex robots that are predicted to
engage in intimate relationships in place of or in addition to human counterparts. Because of
their human-like embodiment, it is likely (as evidenced by the data collected) that sex robots will
be considered as beings whose sexual behavior is actualized. Their bodies, then, as well as the
ethical concerns which accompany them, can be utilized as case studies for exploring the
function and nature of human sexuality, at large. Their ability to transgress the boundaries of real
human sexuality, despite their bodies being only mimicries of our own, points to limitations in
our understandings of love and sex, deconstructing the understanding of sexuality as a human
characteristic. The relationship between fear and desire, reality and fantasy, that sex robots make
live is an illustration, therefore, not only of the future role of sex robots but of the qualifications
of our own humanity, as well.
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